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2006 Sago Mine disaster The Sago Mine disaster was a coal mine explosion on January 2 2006 in the Sago Mine in Tallmansville,
West Virginia, USA that trapped 13 miners for nearly two days. One miner survived. It
was the worst mining disaster in the |
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The explosion
The incident occurred at the
beginning of the first shift after the mine had closed for the New Year holiday weekend. An inspection at The explosion at approximately In the winter, changes in barometric pressure can cause methane to pool in mines, a cause of other
cold-weather mining accidents. Fourteen men on the second cart
escaped the initial explosion. The 13 trapped miners were on the first cart,
which apparently passed the point where the explosion occurred. The foreman
on the second cart, whose brother was among those trapped, as well as the
mine superintendent and three others who entered the mine following the
explosion, tried to return down the shaft to rescue the trapped miners. They
made it as far as 9,000 feet (2,743 m) down the shaft before air quality monitors indicated there was too much carbon
monoxide to proceed. In addition, repairs which they
made to the ventilation system raised fears that increased fresh air to the
interior of the mine might cause a second explosion. |
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Rescue effort
Delays in starting the search
Ken Ward, Jr., an investigative
reporter for the Charleston (WV) Gazette wrote in a January 15, 2006 story
entitled Chaos marred critical early hours after blast, that the
company did not call a specialized mine rescue crew until 8:04 a.m. — more
than 90 minutes after the blast. The company notified the federal Mine safety
and Health Administration at Rescuers had to wait 12 hours after
the explosion to begin to reach the miners due to high concentrations of carbon monoxide (CO) and methane gas in the shaft. Tests
taken through holes drilled from the surface showed that the air near where
the miners were last known to be stationed contained 1,300 parts per million
of carbon monoxide (400 parts per million is the maximum considered safe). [2] Since the blast disabled the mine's
internal communications system, the condition of the 13 miners was unknown.
They had air-purifying equipment that would give them
seven hours of breathable air, but no oxygen tanks. Emergency supplies were stored in 55-gallon drums within the mine. Further
delays
Even after the gases abated, rescuers
had to proceed with caution. Safety regulations required that they
continually test for dangers to themselves such as water seeps and gas
concentrations, limiting their rate of progress to 1,000 feet (305 m) an
hour. They checked in every 500 feet (152 m), and then disconnected their
telephones until the next checkpoint in order to avoid the possibility of a spark creating another explosion. MSHA had deployed
a 1,300-lb. (520 kg) robot into the mineshaft as well, but pulled it out
after it tipped and got a flat tire 2,600 feet from the mine entrance. In Ward's story mentioned above, he
also reported that after more than nine hours of searching, rescue teams
pulled out of the mine at about Locating the trapped miners
The 13 trapped men were located about
2 miles (3.2 km) along the slanting mine shaft, about 280 feet (85 m) below
ground. Five four-man teams attempted to make their way down the 5.5-foot
(167 cm)-high shaft. As of Two 6.25-inch (15.9 cm) holes were
drilled into the mineshaft from above into areas where the miners were
believed to be. Microphones and video cameras lowered into them for ten-minute periods did
not find any signs of life. Air quality tests performed through the first
hole on the morning of January 3 that indicated CO levels in that part of the
shaft were at 1,300 parts per million, over three times the 400 parts per million
tolerance of the human body. Officials called this "very
discouraging." A third hole encountered groundwater and could not be drilled all the way down. However, the miners were very
experienced and trained to find a safe part of the tunnel and barricade
themselves into it in the event of an explosion or collapse. Experts expected
that a third hole, if successful, could expand the
opening and provide a better way of rescuing the miners than going the long
way down the shaft. Miners are required to carry a Self-Contained
Self-Rescuer (SCSR) that provides a brief supply of oxygen for
evacuation. The first report on the status of the
condition of the miners came just before Soon after the first reports of
survivors surfaced, several ambulances were seen lining up at the scene to
prepare to transport the miners. Hospital spokesperson Turner said that the
hospital ER was prepared to respond to a situation in which 12 miners were
able to find some shelter and await rescue. The remaining miners were found
at the working face of the second left portion of the mine, some 2.5 miles
from the mine entrance, behind a "rough barricade structure," as
described by Hatfield [5].
This is the same area where drillings indicated high carbon monoxide levels. Forty-one hours after the incident
began, twelve of the miners were found dead in the early morning hours of January 4. One, Randal L. McCloy Jr., was found alive, but in critical condition. At the time McCloy was found alive,
it was erroneously reported that 11 others were also alive [6].
Thirty minutes later, the rescue team told company officials that the
original report was incorrect. Ben Hatfield, CEO of International Coal Group which owns the mine, states that he asked
state troopers to inform clergy to tell people inside Sago Church that there
were now conflicting reports, but the news didn't reach family members. They
expressed anger that they were allowed to continue to celebrate for another
two-and-a-half hours. Officials and reporters blamed "miscommunication"
between rescuers and the command center for the erroneous information, but
questions were raised about the news media's role in the spread of the incorrect
information. [7] Hatfield indicated that carbon
monoxide levels in the area where the miners were found was
in the range of 300-400 ppm when the rescue team
arrived. This is near the safe threshold level to support life. He said that
carbon monoxide poisoning was the likely cause of death. "Our intentions are to do the
right thing and protect our people the best we can," Hatfield said.
Federal and state mining officials will conduct a "thorough
investigation" of the accident "with full company support." Early response of
government officials
Governor Joe Manchin,
who lost an uncle in the 1968 Farmington Mining Disaster, arrived at the Sago site on January 2 after flying in from Atlanta, Georgia, where he was preparing to watch the West Virginia University Mountaineers football team play in the Sugar Bowl. Congresswoman Shelley Moore Capito
was also among the officials that joined the family members at the scene. The Mine
Safety and Health Administration had approximately 25 people on the scene at
any given time, according to the Agency's Web site. |
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Mine Ownership
Anker West
Virginia Mining
Anker West
Virginia Mining is listed as the permittee for the
Sago Mine. International Coal Group
(ICG)
In March 2005, ICG agreed to acquire Anker Coal Group, Inc. {In its third quarter report dated
October 26, 2005, ICG reported, "All conditions to
closing the acquisitions have been satisfied other than effectiveness of the
related registration statement." [8] International Coal Group, Inc. [9]
was formed in May 2004 by investor Wilbur Ross, who led a group that bought
many of Horizon Natural Resources' assets in a bankruptcy auction. The
company produces coal from 12 mining complexes in Northern and International Coal Group announced
that on January 5, 2006, it brought in Dix & Eaton to
assist with communications efforts regarding the Sago Mine accident. [10] |
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Safety violations in prior
inspections
In 2005, the mine was cited by the
federal Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) 208 times for violating regulations, up from 68 in 2004. Of those, 96
were considered significant and substantial. [11] Additionally, Some of those citations were for
violations that could have been factors in the accident, such as failure to
control methane and coal-dust accumulation, failure to properly shore up
shafts against collapse and overall deficiencies in emergency planning. However, MSHA reports that none of
the violations were considered to be an "immediate risk of injury"
and that all but three violations, related to shoring up the roof, were
corrected by the time of the accident. They say the increased violations were
related to increased inspections.[12] Mining
operations at the Sago Mine more than doubled between 2004 and 2005,
prompting MSHA to dramatically increase – by 84% – its on-site inspection and
enforcement presence. As a result, MSHA also took significantly more
enforcement actions – 208 in total – against Sago Mine in 2005, requiring the
operator to quickly correct health and safety violations in accordance with
federal Mine Act standards. MSHA records also showed that since
the year 2000, Sago miners had suffered 42 injuries that resulted in lost
work time. In 2004 the mine's injury rate for hours worked was nearly three
times the national average. |
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US Department of Labor government
investigation
On January 4, 2006, U.S. Secretary of Labor Elaine L. Chao, stated that its "Mine Safety and Health
Administration is launching a full investigation to determine the cause of
this tragedy and will take the necessary steps to ensure that this never
happens again." [15] Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA)
The MSHA issued its own release
announcing the independent eight-member which would conduct the investigation
including the cause of the explosion, compliance with regulations and the
handling of information on the trapped miners' condition. The team would
examine the site, interview mine personnel and others with information,
review records and plans, inspect any equipment
involved and issue any citations for violations. Richard A. Gates, MSHA district
manager in In its January 5, 2006 version of questions, the MHSA site
reiterated, "The team will be headed up by a senior MSHA safety
professional who has not been part of the initial inspection and enforcement
efforts," http://www.msha.gov/sagomine/SagoQA01052006.asp On January 9, 2006, David G. Dye, acting assistant secretary of
labor for mine safety and health, issued a news release available on the MHSA
website, stating "MSHA joins Governor Manchin
and the State of West Virginia in announcing that we will conduct a joint
investigation into the Sago Mine disaster, which will include a joint public
hearing. Office of the Solicitor,
Division of Mine Safety and Health
Attorneys James Crawford, Tim
Williams and Bob Wilson will assist in the investigation according to MSHA's January 4, 2006 release available on the website. |
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Senate Appropriations Committee:
Labor, Heath Human Services and Education Subcommittee government
investigation
On January 9, 2006, on his congressional website, the
Committee's ranking Democrat Senator Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va.,
announced a January 19, 2006 hearing, crediting Senator Arlen Specter,
R-Pa., and Senator Tom Harkin, D-Iowa, ranking Democrat on the subcommittee
for their help in its scheduling. “The families of the Sago miners
deserve to know what happened in that mine,” Byrd said. “Just as importantly,
miners and their families across this country want to know that steps are
being taken to prevent others from ever experiencing such pain.”[19] He added, "The investigation at
the "In Congress, there are tough
questions to be asked of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA). Is enforcement of coal mining regulations tough enough? Are the
regulations on the books today current enough to handle the challenges posed
by 21st century coal mining? Are mine hazards being minimized? These and
other issues demand scrutiny, and the miners’ families deserve the answers." On January 13, on its website, the committee issued a
notice of the subcommittee meeting. Federal federal
witnesses would be Acting Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and
Health David Dye, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health Bob
Friend, Coal Mine Safety and Health Administrator Ray McKinney and Mine
Safety and Health Associate Solicitor, Edward Claire. Industry witnesses will
be International Coal Group (ICG) President and CEO Ben Hatfield, West
Virginia Coal Association Senior Vice President Chris Hamilton and National
Mining Association Vice President for Safety and Health Bruce Watzman. On January 18, 2006, on its website, the committee rescheduled
the hearing for January 23, 2006. The witness list remained the same. [21] The testimony from
the hearings were posted on the Appropriations Committee website.
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Senate Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions (HELP) Committee government investigation
In a January 10, 2006 letter found on his website, Senator Jay
Rockefeller (D-WV) wrote committee chairman Mike Enzi(R-WY) and ranking
Democrat, Edward M. Kenneday (MA). Also signing the
letter were coal state senators Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), Rick Santorum (R-PA),
Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), Richard Durbin (D-IL), Richard Shelby (R-AL), Evan Bayh (D-IN), Barack Obama (D-IL), Jim Bunning (R-KY), Ken Salazar (D-CO),
Mitch McConnell (R-KY), and Richard Lugar (R-IN). In a press release about
the letter, Rockefeller stated, "We need to know why the
administration thinks that it can carry out a policy where it is committing
fewer and fewer resources to meet an industry that has more and more needs. “We need congressional hearings not
only so that we can determine what happened at Sago, but, more broadly, about
the state of mine safety across That date, Enzi issued a press
release found on the committee's website that he was working with Kenneday to hold an oversight hearing in early March into
safety procedures and enforcement measures related to the disaster. He also
would hold a confirmation hearing January 31, 2006 for Bush's nominee to head the Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA), Richard Stickler. He announced he had
written a January 5, 2006 letter to Labor Secretary Elaine L. Chao requesting “regular and comprehensive briefings on
the progress and preliminary findings” of the MSHA investigation. and enforcement efforts at the Sago mine. House Education and
Workforce Committee: Workforce Protections Subcommittee government
investigation
On January 4, 2006, Representatives
George Miller (D-CA) and Major Owens (D-NY) wrote a letter posted on Miller's
website to Chairman John Boehner (R-OH) asking for a hearing, saying Congress
had abdicated its oversight responsibilities on worker safety issues, while
the Bush administration filled worker safety agencies with industry insiders.
[23] On The chairman, along with subcommitte Charlie Norwood (R-GA) issued a statement
posted on the committee's website, "We expect MSHA to produce a thorough
account of the events that occurred before, during, and after this tragedy,
and the Committee will closely monitor this investigation to ensure its
timely completion. Following a full accounting of the facts, the Committee
will examine the results of the investigation and determine what appropriate
steps may be necessary to ensure a similar tragedy never happens again.” [25] |
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Findings to Date
Lightning Strike and
Seismic Activity
Weatherbug,
a Germantown, MD-headquartered weather tracking system reported on January 6, 2006 that “The evidence suggests that the
lightning strike could have caused the explosion due to the correlation
between the timing and location of the lightning strike and seismic
activity.” The company's equipment detected 100
lightning strikes in the region within 40 minutes of the explosion. A single,
powerful lightning strike registered at or near the mouth of the Sago mine at
Dr. Martin Chapman, PhD, a Virginia
Tech research assistant professor, found that two independent sensors
recorded a minor seismic event, possibly from the explosion, 2 seconds later
at Media
coverage
News of the Sago mine explosion first
broke widely to television viewers on the cable news channel CNN. At
approximately Hundreds of media, reporters, camera
crews, satellite trucks and photographers descended on the small community,
taking over yards and setting up camp outside the CNN, Fox News with Geraldo Rivera and MSNBC with Rita Cosby all broadcast live from Sago throughout the
night of January 3 and early morning of January 4 as the story continually
changed. Shortly before rumors started
spreading that the miners were found alive Tuesday night (and then reversed
Wednesday morning), a reporter there posted a description of the scene on his
blog: Sago
Road, where the mine is, follows the Miscommunication and wrong
reports
The Seattle
Post-Intelligencer at About Gov. Manchin,
who was in the church with the families when the first incorrect reports
began to come in, was soon seen outside the church celebrating "a
miracle." The governor later said that his staff never confirmed that
there were survivors, but was euphoric along with the families at what seemed
to be remarkable news. Congresswoman Capito
appeared on CNN about
Lynette Roby being
interviewed by CNN television journalist Anderson Cooper on At about Hatfield confirmed the
miscommunication at a press conference shortly thereafter. Initial
information indicated that the miscommunication occurred between the rescue
team in the mine and the command center at the surface. According to
Hatfield, several personnel at the center were able to simultaneously hear
the communications directly from the rescue team. Because of the state regulatory
officials on site, both company and state officials, including
representatives from the governor's office, were present at the command
center. Hatfield estimated that 15-20 minutes elapsed before they learned
that there was in fact a miscommunication. "Bad
information"
The CEO said he did not know how the
reports of 12 survivors spread, and noted that ICG never officially made that
statement, calling it "bad information" that "spread like
wildfire." He said that the information could have been spread through
"stray cell phone communication." "I have no idea who made
that announcement," he said, "but it was not an announcement that
International Coal Group had authorized." Asked by reporters why the company
allowed rumors to circulate for several hours, Hatfield said officials had
been trying to clarify and verify information before putting family members
on an even worse emotional rollercoaster. However, Fox correspondent Bill Hemmer said he was "ashamed" of how the
media repeatedly reported the existence of survivors even as reporters and
producers themselves were growing to understand that, in his words,
"something didn't add up." Hemmer noted that the coal company,
which had been quite punctual in its dealings with the media throughout the
rescue attempt, had not given any information to corroborate the allegations
that 12 miners had been rescued, and that the always-available Manchin was nowhere to be found, yet the cable news
channels continued to report the story anyway until doctors in a hospital
many miles away stated that they had had no contact with emergency service
personnel about any of the miners except for McCloy. Speaking on MSNBC's Imus in the Morning program, Lisa Daniels speculated that erroneous reports about
survivors on local radio stations were heard by mine officials, causing them
to question the accuracy of their own information stating that 12 of the 13
were dead, which in turn delayed an official announcement.
Article heading
appearing at approximately Wrong
headlines
Many Wednesday morning newspapers in
the United States erroneously reported on their front pages
that 12 miners were found alive. (pdf)
USA Today ran a headline in their East Coast edition that read "Alive!
Miners beat odds". The printed New York Times attributed their
information to the family members, but the Times's
website initially displayed an article heading that expressed the live rescue
as fact (see screen capture at right). Others, such as the Washington Post,
were unclear as to to whom they attributed their information. In a published report on the website
of the newspaper trade journal Editor & Publisher, the editor of The Inter-Mountain, a local afternoon daily based in Elkins, West Virginia blamed the national media's inaccurate
reporting on a lack of knowledge of local culture. "We get a lot of
people here who sometimes believe they have an inside story because they hear
it on a police scanner or listen to a conversation," Linda Skidmore
said. "We know to be cautious of those situations." [28] Media
criticism of MSHA
Broader criticisms of how mine safety
is handled by the federal government were also made in the aftermath of the
disaster; such criticisms have been considered controversial by some. Some have suggested that the severity of the accident's aftermath may have been related in part to inadequate safety standards endorsed by the MSHA under David Lauriski | |||
